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In Quest of Identity - An
Introduction
Vintilă Mihăilescu
1 At the time when we are trying to draft this introduction for the articles that compose
this volume, an image of childhood comes back to our mind : a mean little dwarf called
Rumpelstilchen is  dancing in a  forest  around a  fire while  singing :  “Ach wie  gut  dass
niemand  weiss.  Dasich  Rumpelstilchen  heis”  (Luckily,  nobody  knows  that  my  name  is
Rumpelstilchen).  This  is  a  tale of  the Grimm brothers in which all  the power of  the
forest's small spirit remains in the fact that no one knows his real name. And the story
ends when, hidden behind a tree, the hero hears Rumpelstilchen sing. The day after, he
calls him by his name and thus triumphs over the dwarf. 
2 To give a name, to be named ... The tale of the Grimm brothers is a story amongst others
that illustrates the magic of the name. To have (to acquire) a name, to give a name - and
even “to someone of all sorts of names” - has always constituted the ritual gestures of a
power play. Power that one can consider of “ontological” order, the extent of which the
game is part of human condition. Only God, the Big Anonymous. “The one who is what he
is”, is not submitted to that game of designation. 
3 With such a concept in mind, one looks at these articles and asks oneself is identity has not
become the family name of this era's Rumpelstilchen. Certainly a more “technical” and
desenchanted term, identity designates the new “spirits of the place” which meddle the
forces of power's new games (or even stakes). The tales of our childhood have become
unrecognisable ... 
4 One can therefore ask oneself, with Christian Bromberger, if identity has not become “a
sort of melting pot,  a universal can-opener which would enable ta scamp one's work
while dispensing a detailed analysis of facts ?” And one can also ask one self if the use of
identity is  only stemmed from the will  of  the actors themselves or  if  the observers'
(anthropologists included) discursive reasoning has not also contributed to creating this
situation.  Doesn't  defining  “objectively”  identities  come  out  to,  in  a  certain  way,
designate them, give them a name ? Isn't carrying out a study on identity a way of being
in quest of identity ? We have already observed this for ethnology : to speak about it,
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comes out to create a bit of it. “I do not know if you realize it. Mr. Rumpelstilchen. but
what you are speaking about is of identity ... ” 
 
The heritage of identity 
5 The problems of identity, mostly ethnie, tend to occupy the front scene of public opinion
and of scientific problematics. Developped by the media and by a growing number of
colloquiums, special series of magazines, interviews and professional events on all sorts
of matters, discussions on indentity have acquired a dramatic and exceptional nature. In
their turn, “suspicions” generated by these “excesses” (as Bromberger would say) only
exaggerate  the  sensation  of  novelty  and  of  originality  related  to  the  identitary
phenomena. After all, one is taken so much by discussions, that one loses the notion of
reality. So, in casting a “distant glance” on this “identitary complex”, one is tempted to
ask openly the question : what is in stake and why does one speak about it when one
discusses about identity ? 
6 The articles gathered in this volume try to envisage all the answers to this question. 
7 Firstly, Giulio Angioni tries in all serenity to have identity come into line, and tum it into
the “banality” of  a  universal  and basic  awareness,  far  more anciant  than its  present
flamboyant existence. Considering conscience in general, its intersubjectivity and, more
specifically, the feeling of belonging, or what is called collective identity, remains “one of
the most constituent and universal attitudes of human groups”. Through the antithetical logic
which underlies it and which opposes the “Me” to the “Other”, through the territoriality
that illustrates this opposition and the aggressivity that accompanies this territoriality,
“identity  brings  us closer  to  the  rest  of  what  is  called  the animal  reign”.  Besides,  human
ethnology is deploying great efforts to bring up more than one argument as regards the
biologie al origin of “foreign production”. 
8 Even if such a far-fetching reasoning is not accepted, there is still the other “banality”,
this one being totally “anthropological” ,  and of which all  introductions of ethnology
refer to ;  it  opposes since immemorable times “we, the human beings” to ”them, the
nonhuman beings”. Marianne Mesnil and Assia Popova have closely observed this “
banality” amongst the “Walloons, the Welsh and other Valakians”. 
9 Thereby,  one can trace,  beyond the actual identitary language,  a much more anciant
problematic. The concept of identity is influenced by a human constituent phenomena
which is experienced and perceived differently according to eras and cultures. But since
we are confronted with identity in the ambit of agame. whose different expressions are
certainly historicized but whose rules are practically immutable, why then is there all
this turmoil around identity ? Why are surprising and decisive novelties given priority ?
Why is there all this movement between “excess and suspicions”, between exaltation and
anguish ? 
 
Identity and raging toothache 
10 Behind  the  scenes  of  one  of  these  numerous  conferences  on  identity,  someone  was
commenting as follows : “identity is like a tooth ; one only thinks about it when it hurts”. Joking
apart, it is undoubtly true that one does not ask as many questions on one's “identity” as
long as one is merged in the “routine of existing”, as long as one can live in peace and be
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happy to simply live. It is only at a time when this carefree routine staggers for a reason
or another that identitary anxieties appear. 
11 Confronted with the upsurge of the actual identitary discursive reasoning and daims, one
should  therefore  raise  the  question  about  the  “frenzy”  that  seems  to  have  invaded
mankind today. 
12 It is somehow in this perspective that François Laplantine manages to consider “these
different movements of identitary protests as processes of “reactional demodemisation”. Beyond
the term of “demodernisation” - maybe arguable - what still remains, is the project of
modemity's global crisis and the identitary reactions related to the latter. 
13 The “end of ideologies” seems to be, after all that has been written on the matter, an
accomplished fact. The recent collapse of communism is hence just the final dramatic
point of a process of longer date which eroded the big systems of reference which a
majority of people took as an example for their life “routine”. More particularly,  the
opposition  between communism and capitalism has  played  the  role  of  an  identitary
lullaby, by offering a revised and corrected representation of the perpetuate opposition
between “we, the human being” and “them, the non-human beings”.  (As regards the
mythological analysis of Mesnil and Popova, the citizens of the Eastern countries will no
doubt remember to what extent the Western countries' young people's long hair was
presented as the expression of de cadence itself, or even of the state of “barbarism“ of the
West  and  how  we  struggled  to  prove  our  civility  through  the  autochtones'  strict
discipline !) This division had the advantage of being simple, within reach, general (the
Third World being a “integrated third”, whether one likes it or not, in the confrontation
of the two blocs) and reversible (each one could chose freely the “good” side and the “
bad” side). In brief, providing that one would not be too demanding (and that one would
not be its victim !), that conflict could offer minimal “identitary” references for everyone.
All  the  more  since  the  system  also  proposed  conditions  of  existence  to  identities
dreaming of refusing the “me different from others”. 
14 The collapse of communism - and by the same means, of the world's separation in two - is
the last event in date of the world's longer term process of disenchantment (in fact,
although atheist,  communism was nonetheless a universal belief).  The crisis,  which is
reaching its peak only now, is defined by two essential traits : it is globaland it is a crisis of
faith(which does not necessarily mean that it is a religion crisis). According to that point
of view, an important part of  the phenomena,  said to be “particularist”,  in fact only
consists of reactions to that global crisis of belief which tries to find global answers to the
desenchantment of the world. It is the diversity of such phenomenas on the one hand,
and their “dissidence” compared to the dominant universalist project on the other hand,
that make us be mistaken on their universalistic or, in any case, globalising vocation. As
regards what is called - improperly, according to François Laplantine -  “the retum of
religion”.“It is a question of making a distinction in relation ta the rest of humanity”. 
15 If one analyses it closer, it is not identity as such that is attractive or frightening, but
rather its signification “hic” and “nunc”. The development of identity takes place at a
time when the universalist project of Reason was thought to exp and through its world-
wide application. It is at that precise time that its uniformising pressure reaches its peak
and becomes “perceivable”,  that its  force plays a determining role for all  who,  for a
reason or another, do not feel at ease in the part of the “universal man”. For those people,
it is now or never that they should react. Thus, the identitary “disuniversalist” exaltation.
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16 Moreover, it is at that precise time that the stake becomes essential for all the partisans
of the Big Project. Now is the time when the destiny of the superb civilizing utopia of the
two last centuries is being cast. Thus the refusal from the “universalists” toaccept these
identitary expressions that constitute as many slaps in the face of Reason. 
 
Identify identities and differenciate differences 
17 In the way things are going, reality and discursive reasoning often intermingle into a
disconcerting  “panidentersim”.  Nevertheless,  not  every  social  or  cultural  part  of
existence  is  systematically  “identitary”.  One  does  not  bury  one's  dead  with  an  “
identitary” objective ! It is only when one notices that they are not buried like others,
when that difference corresponds to a factor of differenciation and when an intentional
reasoning is expressed on the particularities related to the funeral,  that funerals can
become an “identitary mark”. What remains to be determined is why funerals have been
chosen as an identitary sign and why, generally, such signs are needed. The development
of such an identitary discursive reasoning is in great part due to the confusion between
these different levels of social existence which makes everything liable of being treated as
an identitary phenomena. In this conceptual darkness, all identities are black... 
18 Confronted with this conceptual skid, the different authors of this volume have felt the
need ta define the level of identity's existence in itself, toidentity what is and what is not
identity or the different types of identity. It is necessary to make a distinction more often
between the level of social structure, behavioural practices, empiric characteristics of
one's “me”, on the one hand, and the level of presentation of one's “me”, the discursive
reasoning or the image that one has of  basic reality,  on the other hand ;  distinction
between  “interactional  identity”and  “ideological  identity”made  by  Imre  Eros,  between
“belonging”and  “reference”by  Pierre  Centlivres between  “performative  identity”by 
Christian  Bromberger,  etc.  And  everyone  -  or  almost  -  likes  to  discover  the  gaps
between  the  two  levels,  the  differences  between  experienced  identity  and  related
identity, the “collective conversions” which make the identitary image of one same social
reality change according to the circumstances. 
19 On the same line of idea of this first assessment. one can - and one must - go further.
Indeed, as “interactional identity”(to use I. Eros's terminology as a reference) is submitted
to several  of  interactions,  so  is  “ideological  identity”todifferent  ideologies.  The studies
presented  in  this  volume  attest  largely  this  fact.  Firstly,  there  are  structurally  and
objectively different interactional contexts :  the relational tissue is not the same in a
situation of nomadism, in the diasporas or in compact autochtonous communities. The
other, the foreigner, does not have the same status when one goes from one foreigner ta
the other along the paths of transhumance, when one receives the foreigner at one's
home and when one goes to settle down at the other's home. 
20 In her report  on the Aroumains,  Irina Nicolau gives  us  an exemplary account :  this
population (essentially shepherds and later traders disseminated throughout the Balkanic
states) uses no less than 65 ethonyms ! (names derived from toponyms not included). How
can one live in such an “identitary” ambiguity ? - the author asks. When one looks closer,
ambiguity disappears in order to give way to an adaptable but coherent logic. The 65
ethonyms are not used at any moment or time. In facto they are not synonyms but define
different  relational  dualities :  “the  Greeks  call  us  Kulovlahi,  the  Aroumains  from  Greece
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Viryareni,  the  Bulgarians  Vlasi,  the  Aroumains  farsirot  Cipani,  the  Roumanians  of  Roumania
Machedoni. Nobody knows that we are Gr'mu(teani' - declares an elder person of 80 years. And
Rumpelstilchen, do you remember ? 
21 Less  spectacular,  but  all  the  more  typical  is  the  case  of  the  Roumanian  village
community : it gives us the example ofa relations between “we” and the “others”, which,
according to E. Popescu“does not form a dearbinay opposition between good/bad, beneficial/
malefic, true/wrong. The compensatory system applied by traditional mentality euphemises these
relations  in  order  to  control  them  better :unknown/recognisable,  contaminated/curable,
dangerous/tameable”. The “other” does not have the absolute and exclusive character of the
antithesis “us” - “the others”. Together, “us” and “the other” form a constituent relational
matrix whereby the foreigner is never total or definitive and the autochtone is always
positional.  T. Guéorguiéva gives us an example of  similar relations and negociations
between Bulgarians, Turcs and Pomaks of the Rodopes, that often dramatic identitary
conflicts do not spare all the same. 
22 A more general form of “interactional identity”, other than the particular examples, seems
to appear. It is tempting to calI it relationism. It gives a priority to community relations
compared to individual terms in relations ; it supposes a social legislation (a ritualisation
in  this  case)  which  concerns  rather  relations  between  people  than  “rights  and
obligations” of individuals as such. In brief, one can say that in the case of “relationism”,
it is the relation that creates and defines the se terms and not the terms that create a
relation. In this last case, it is preferable to speak of essentialism, because the terms of the
relations are related to individual factors that interact “afterwards”1. Essentialism, which
is typical of our individualist societies and of our mental habits of “clear” catagorisation,
supposes a behavioural logic different from the one of relationalism, more laxist. 
23 Without developing further here such an analysis,  even go a minimal methodological
prudence seems to suggest a somewhat nuanced use of common catagories such as “us
and the others”,  “foreigner”,  “xenophobia”,  etc.,  that  do not systematically have the
same  scope  and  the  same  signifiance  in  the  two  contexts  which  have  just  been
differenciated. 
24 A similar differenciation (but not synonymous) is necessary for “ideological identity”. Louis
Dumont  suggests  this  at  the  beginning  of  his  book  on  German  ideology  with  this
constrastive observation : “I have contrasted the French as follows : ”I am a man by nature and
French by accident” and the German : ”I am fundamentally German, and l am a man thanks to my
quality as German”. ( ... ) It is obvious that if these two men are talking about the diversity
of cultures, they do not have the same opinion, they are not speaking on the same level :
the German man speaks about the essential, the French about contrasted, but secondary
diversities” (Dumont, 1992). 
 
Identity between spirit and appearance 
25 For  obvious  historical  reasons,  “German  ideology”  of  identity  if  often  frightening.
Appearance-identity is easily prefered tospiritidentity ; the critical analysis of the actual
identitary phenomena speaks more about identity “which is created” than identity which
“is”.
26 The idea of “production of identity” - described in this volume by Gérard Althabe and
Rose-Marie Lagrave - can be considered, by simplitying, as a synthesis of the French
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more  universalist  ideology  the  American  mode  interactionist  methodology.  As  an
approach, it is an efficient and subtle instrument that enables to demonstrate the exalted
pretentions of all the “We, the Thraces”, “We, the Celtic” and other identities. These more
or less tacit presuppositions can be summarized as follows : if there is identity, it is one
and universdal, that of human nature or simply of the human ; everything that is “below”
is the result of a particular interactional context and remains particular and secondary.
On  the  contrary,  “production”  as  such  is  carried  out  by  universal  mecanisms :  the
production of one self and/ or of the other would therefore be the invariable factor of
“identitary differences”. And it is this invariability which is essential and which should be
sought. 
27 Although subtle and fecund, nonetheless this “constructivist” approach raises problems.
The first question that can be brought up is to know if the “production of identity” is
submitted to the same rules whatever the historical and cultural, if the conceptual and
methodological transformation from the one situation to the other is licit or not. 
28 Another problem is raised, more or less indirectly, by Christian Bromberger :  “if the
locating,  the production, the assertion,  the perception of  identities  have become the
subject of numerous punctual studies, ethnology in France has, on the other hand and
paradoxically,  analysed a  lot  less  the social  effects  generated by the conscience of  a
common  belonging”.  Identities  have  been  examined  “in  their  origin,  through  their
organisation - in their actual state, through the echo of their resonance in the short term
and the  long term”.  Does  the  fact  of  giving  oneself  a  “perfomative”  identity,  which
extends beyond “subtantial” identity, remain without marketing “substantial” identity
itself ?  Is  the  identity  “created”  exterior  to  the  “structural  characteristics  of
phenomenas” ? To paraphrase Kundera, this would lead us to an “unbearable lightness of
identity”. However, this identity stays indisputably “heavy”, this being somewhat related
to belief. The belief of being someone else ... 
29 An essential question is raised openly by Cecile Zervoudacki : the reason of all history.
“Ethnicity is not, indeed, a social ressource like others”. Therefore, it cannot be send to
the communal grave. It is necessary ta seek its reason of existence “in its origin”, maybe
even  further  behind  than  the  author  thinks.  It  is  necessary  ta  retrace  the  role  of
ethnologists from being reduced to that of a Zorro denouncing impostures” (Bromberger
). 
 
Manipulation and kitsch 
30 “… The need of identity, if abstract is nonetheless tangible. The need of roots in a local society has
not  disappeared”-  declare the mayors of  big suburbs of  Provence in an official  report
published in 1985 (quoted by Morel). The unasiness expressed by elected councillors is
obvious ; what seems more doubtful is the recommended treatment. ”Elected councillors
make the settling of populations a key element of their policy. But, how can one “settle” populations
if they have not taken root ? ( ... ) The complex phenomena of settlement which implies duration,
jusional  relations,  interknowledge.  etc...  is  reduced to one of  its  characteristics :  the feeling of
belonging toa place”.  Therefore, doens't the stake reside in “inventing new forms of social
solidarity coherent with the dominant logic of society ? ” (Morel) 
31 The answer that Andreas Bimmer gives to that question is unequivocal :  the modern
feasts organised by municipalities in order to “settle“ their populations make us think of
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the “political folklore” rather than the notion of feast. "... Spacial and regional factors no
longer dejine theformation ofidentity. As for modemfeasts, they are no longer sufficient to found a
new identity”. The analysis of one of these feasts (the Hessentag) is an example. 
32 On  another  scale,  Zoltan  Biro and  Julianna  Bodo have  observed  the  voluntarist
construobserved the voluntarist creation of a regional identity, of a “feeling of belonging
to  a  place”  in  the  case  of  a  newly  created  region  in  Roumania :  the  Harghita.  This
“production of identity” includes almost all the formai elements of a creation of identity
in general. However, “harghiteanism” does not develop and people are not able to “take
roots”  in  the  administrative  zone that  is  proposed to  them as  theirs.  This  does  not
prevent “political folklore” from carrying along. 
33 A more classic  example is  givin by Zusana Stefanikova who analyses  the identitary
creation of the Slovac “national costume” and its anti-Hungarian “reactive” fluctuations
dating from the Habsbourg era. its anti-German period during the Third Reich. etc. This
example is not only more “classic“ but also different, from the fact that the “national
costume” kept a permanent referent through the “folkloric costume”, recognised and
shared by the community as being theirs “from the beginning”. And it is precisely that
difference  that  enables  us  to  foresee  a  fundamental  gap  in  the  recent  indetitary
manipulations. 
34 The need to incorporate history, a more or less mythicised pasto although shared by the
community, is an essential component of identity. The “success” of the Greek community
of Pont-de-Cheruy described by Cecile Zervoudacki seems to entail the creation and the
acceptance of an ad-hoc “founding myth”. 
35 Different  factors  seem  to  suggest  that  the  “horizontal”  reference  functional  and
synchronie, of identity is not sufficient for the human being. A fundamental need brings
us to find references beyond the limits  of  our existence “hic” and ”nunc”.“Vertical”
references drawn from the past in arder ta transform them into a gift in the form of
beliefs, seem to be unavoidable. To stay a human being, one ismore than one lives.
36 However, it is precisely these “fibers of diacrony”, these “vertical references” which have
systemically been atrophied by modernity, concentrated by definition on the present.
Besides real uprootings on a geographical level (emigration, etc.) and/or on a time level
(passage of a “traditional” society to a form of industrial society), modernity has also
created  a  general  state  of  uprootingwith  the  worldwide  application  of  values  of  the
present  and of  its  “superficial”  activities.  If  one  accepts  to  call  beliefthis  vertical
proclivity  of  identity,  it  comes  out  to  be,  in  short,  the  theme  of  the  “world's
desenchantment”, the problem of the so-called “return to religion“ and the explanation
to the  usual  failures  in  attempts  to  “settle” :  torn up,  the  “fibers  of  diacrony” have
problems in reconstitating themselves. 
37 Patrimony has constituted the main therapy that authorities as well as local power have
thought of finding as a solution to that “state of uprooting”. The retum of historicity began.
according to Edgar Morin. in the sixties with a “gap in the adhesion to the present”(quoted
by Morel).  Communities  in  distress  tried to  recreate  their  social  relations,  reinforce
them, and give them more stability and personality. Not being able to find real means and
maintain relations that they had developped, people have turned more and more towards
objects that surrounded them. Human solidarity was that way related to the “categories”
and  “systems”  of  objects  and  history  related  to  their  age.  Because  of  the  lack  of
settlement,  “which  implies  duration,  fusional  relations,  interknowledge,  etc.  ”,
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individuals tried  to  create  relations  through  the  means  of  objects :  their  collective
identity  was  created  -  and  weakened  -  by  the  common  reference  to  a  category  of
patrimonial objects. And, according to this logic, everything could become a patrimonial
object... to be consumed afterwards according to the customs of the consumer society.
What was supposed to be an outlet turns out to be an abyss. 
38 The reaction to modernity and its loss in human relations2 transform the hum an being
into a “patrimonial animal” which is represented through objectivized forms - or even as
simple objects - which are “devoured” after. 
39 Is this deformed “anthropophagy” peculiar to kitsch ? An extistencial kitsch, the kitsch of
our existence ... 
NOTES
1.   Regarding  that  point  of  view,  the  famous  American  mode  interactionism  concerns  the
relations  between  terms  that  primarily  been  separated  and  individualised.  Interactions  are
therefore weak relations, because secondary, somehow derived of the "essentialist" nature of
their terms.
2.   "The loss of uman relations (spontaneous. reciprocical. symbolic) is an essential trait of our
societies. On this basis. one can observe the systematic reintroduction of hurnan relations in the
form of signs in the social circuit and the "consommation" of these relations. of this signified
heat". (Baudrillard. 1970-76).
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